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It's Good to Be the King!: Prosecuting Heads
of State and Former Heads of State Under
International Law
MARY MARGARET PENROSE*
This Article criticizes historical practices regarding
the prosecution of sitting and former heads of state. It
argues that such persons should stand trial for their
alleged crimes. However, as the Article illustrates,
state practice and international law as they currently
exist offer only limited help toward advancing this
goal. Although the Pinochet precedent offers evidence
that states may be shifting toward a willingness to
prosecute heads of state, Professor Penrose advocates
the enactment of prosecutorial rules and regulations
and urges countries to take the necessary steps to
create an international criminal court so that criminal
defendants may be tried in a consistent manner in a
judicial forum existing specifically for these purposes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Herald, read the accusation!" said the King.
On this the White Rabbit blew three blasts on the trumpet, and then
unrolled the parchment-scroll, and read as follows:
"The Queen of Hearts, she made some tarts,
All on a summer day:
The Knave of Hearts, he stole those tarts
And took them quite away!"
"Consider your verdict," the King said to the jury.
"Not yet, not yet!" the Rabbit hastily interrupted. "There's a great
deal to come before that!"
1
When Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini died prior to capture
at the end of World War II, a grave travesty occurred. The
international community was denied the long-awaited opportunit, of
bringing these alleged perpetrators of heinous crimes to justice.2 If
either had survived, we can only project that they would have stood
trial with the other Nuremberg defendants under the clear language of
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg? On
an intellectual level we know that each of the other twenty-two
Nuremberg defendants saw his day in court and suffered the penalties
pronounced against him.4 Yet, not one of these individuals was
1. LEwIS CARROLL, AMICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE
LoOING-GLASs 85 (Bantam Books 1981).
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1671 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the phrase "Omnis
indemnatus pro innoxio legibus habetur" to mean that "[e]very uncondemned person is held
by the law as innocent"). The use of the term "alleged" in relation to Hitler and Mussolini is
simply indicative of this author's firm grounding in U.S. jurisprudence that all are deemed
innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. And, as this Article challenges our ability to
bring such individuals before a tribunal or court, the word "alleged" emphasizes such
individuals' ability to truly escape what many deem to be "justice" -their day in court. Use
of this phrase, however, does not suggest any condonation of the acts or accounts attributed
by many-and, indeed, much evidence-that these individuals were two of the major
architects of the horrific events that define World War II.
3. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, reprinted in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 10 (14 Nov. 1945-1 Oct.
1946). Specifically, Article 7 of the Charter provided that "[t]he official position of the
defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government departments,
shall not be considered in freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment." Id, at
12.
4. Id. at 366-367. Of the twenty-two Nuremberg defendants, only three were
adjudged not guilty. Id. The nineteen remaining received sentences ranging from death by
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considered a sitting or former head of state. And, despite the recent
Pinochet ruling suggesting that former heads of state are not immune
from punishment for gross violations of human rights committed
while serving as head of state (the "Pinochet precedent"), we must on
some level admit that the international community has been reluctant
to bring to trial-not merely indict-any sitting or former head of
state.
5
The most recent events in Yugoslavia have thus far merely
confirmed this trend. While the international community
understandably welcomes the transition to democracy in Yugoslavia,
little has been said regarding the arrest and prosecution of the now
former President, Slobodan Milosevic. Due to the delicate
maneuvering that typically follows a transition to democracy, most
countries focus more on the gain achieved by deposing Milosevic and
far less on the negative implications for the rule of law if Milosevic
ultimately escapes trial.6  Even before Milosevic was removed, a
United Nations human rights representative indicated that perhaps the
granting of an amnesty or immunity from prosecution would be a
worthy exchange were Milosevic to leave office.7 Fortunately, the
situation never required the "brokering" of immunity.8
Even without consideration of Milosevic, the list of potential
defendants is long, current and demands an accounting. For example,
hanging (12 defendants) to life imprisonment (3 defendants) to prison terms between twenty
and ten years imprisonment (4 defendants). Id.
5. The indictment of Slobodan Milosevic has not yet led to his arrest.
6. See, e.g., Slobodan Lekic, EU Leaders to Welcome Kostunica Despite Lingering
War Crimes Doubts, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 13, 2000. The European leaders are currently
focusing on democratic stabilization in the region and leaving the war crimes issue on the
table-for now.
Pressing Kostunica to deliver Milosevic and other indicted war criminals to
the U.N. war crimes tribunal in The Hague-a move deeply unpopular even with
Kostunica's own supporters-could only undermine the stability of the new
administration. "The political transition in Serbia is very tender, it is just several days
old, so we must all be helpful to show some patience," Christina Galach,
spokeswoman for the EU's foreign affairs chief, said Friday. Id. Ms. Galach
continued, "[w]hile war crimes and crimes against humanity cannot be ignored, there
can be no question that we need to distinguish between [war crimes] and the most
urgent needs of the new and vulnerable Serbia of today... namely the consideration
of a fragile democracy which requires domestic peace and consensus." Id.
7. U.N. Prosecutor Rejects Immunity Deal for Milosevic, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at
A26. Jiri Dienstbier, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in the former Yugoslavian
republics, reportedly suggested that Milosevic should be granted immunity from prosecution
before the ICTY in exchange for leaving power.
8. Id. Reacting to the comment reportedly made by Jiri Dienstbier, Carla Del Ponte,
the Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY, responded clearly that there would be no immunity deal
for Milosevic emanating from the Prosecutor's office.
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previously, there was Pol Pot,9 and now all but two prominent Khmer
Rouge figures remain free in Cambodia. 10 In addition, there are Idi
Amin,11 Mengistu Haile Mariam, 12  Jean Claude (aby Doe)
Duvalier, 13 Moammar Gadhafi and Alfredo Stroessner. 14 Reliable
information indicates the present residence of each of these
individuals, 15 yet, only Hissene Habre,16 the former Chadian dictator,
and most recently Indonesia's Suharto, 17 have seemingly been
affected by the Pinochet precedent. 18 Thus, while the words exist that
9. Pol Pot was Head of State during the period known as the Cambodian Killing
Fields. But, as one scholar recounts, "[w]hen Cambodia's Pol Pot unexpectedly became
available for prosecution in 1997... no state was willing to seek his extradition for crimes
committed during his savage leadership. His death one year later forever denied Cambodians
the justice of hearing him answer for his depredations." Diane F. Orentlicher, Putting Limits
on Lawlessness: From Nuremberg to Pinochet, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1998, at CO.
10. Seth Mydans, Cambodia Agrees to Tribunal Setup for Khmer Rouge Trials, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000.
11. Reliable information indicates that Idi Amin lives-with the consent of the local
govemment-in Saudi Arabia. See Karl Vick, Former Chad Dictator Faces Pinochet Test,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2000, at A22 (reporting that "Idi Amin, as self-proclaimed emperor of
Uganda in the 1970s oversaw an estimated 300,000 political killings before finding refuge in
Saudi Arabia"); see also An African Pinochet, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A30
(stating that Amin's "less notorious but no less wanton successor, Milton Obote, is in
Zambia").
12. Vick, supra note 11 (indicating that "former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile
Mariam remains ensconced in Hill, a suburb of Harare, Zimbabwe, where he has lived since
fleeing Addis Ababa in 1991. The deaths of as many as 1 million Ethiopians were attributed
to his Marxist government."). Vick suggests, however, that Mengistu's travels have been
affected by the Pinochet precedent. "When Mengistu traveled to Johannesburg late last year
for medical treatment, human rights groups urged South Africa to arrest him on war crimes
charges, and Ethiopia requested his extradition. However, South Africa moved slowly, and
Mengistu returned to Zimbabwe." Id.
13. An African Pinochet, supra note 11 (reporting that Duvalier, former Head of State
of Haiti, is currently enjoying refuge in France).
14. The former Paraguayan dictator is residing in Brazil. Id.
15. See supra notes 11-14.
16. Pinochet's Peril: Limbo-Consensus Grows to Punish Crimes of Tyranny, With No
Agreement on How, Editorial, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 2000, at 10A (stating that based on the
Pinochet precedent, "the former dictator of Chad, Hissene Habre, is under house arrest in
Senegal, awaiting trial for violations of human rights in Chad"); Cesar Chelala, Op-Ed,
Thanks to Pinochet, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2000, at A13 (emphasizing the implications of
the Pinochet case for "the exiled dictator of Chad, Hissene Habre, who was recently indicted
in Senegal on charges of torture and 'barbarity.' It was the first time a former head of state
had been charged in Africa for human rights violations by the court of another country.").
17. Pinochet's Model Urgedfor Suharto, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6,2000, at A14.
18. A second African Head of State, Jean Kambanda, former Prime Minister of
Rwanda, recently pled guilty to crimes of genocide and was sentenced to life in prison by the
ICTR. See The Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence of Sept. 4 1998, ICTR
97-23-S, available at http://www.ictr.org (last visited Nov. 13, 2000). The distinction
between Habre and Kambanda is that the statutory authority provided by the ICTR overrides
any Pinochet-type defense of domestic immunity. Further, both Pinochet and Habre have
39:193
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permit-and, at times demand--former and sitting heads of state be
prosecuted and possibly punished for their atrocities, the actions of
the world community have fallen short of these proclamations. 19
Perhaps this failure is a testament to the unique nature of
international "law." International law is a limited system constrained
on one end by voluntary compliance of consenting sovereign states
and on the other by the political deadlock of the moment.7° Until
some radical change occurs in international law or the politics of the
moment, it is still good to be the king!
II. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO PUNISH
When she got back to the Cheshire-Cat, she was
surprised to find quite a large crowd collected round it;
there was a dispute going on between the executioner,
the King, and the Queen, who were all talking at once,
while all the rest were quite silent, and looked very
uncomfortable.
The moment Alice appeared, she was appealed to by
all three to settle the question, and they repeated their
arguments to her, though, as they all spoke at once, she
found it very hard to make out exactly what they said.
The executioner's argument was, that you couldn't cut
off a head unless there was a body to cut it off from;
been subjected to state prosecution in countries outside the area where their alleged crimes
were committed. While the ICTR is located in Arusha, Tanzania and, therefore, outside the
area of where the crimes of Kambanda were committed, the tribunal is an international
creation operating under the Chapter VII powers of the United Nations Security Council and
does not represent state prosecution of a foreign defendant.
19. Orentlicher wrote:
Since Nuremberg, international law has affirmed that serious war crimes,
genocide and other crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction.
They transcend the province of the state where the crimes occurred and may be
punished by any state-just as, before Nuremberg, international law allowed
any state to punish piracy. More recently, various treaties have established
similar jurisdiction over terrorism.
But while international law allows-and even encourages-states to
prosecute, few have been willing to do so, however appalling the offense.
Supra note 9.
20. For a good explanation of how the International Criminal Court has the potential to
change this balance, see Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International
Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 385 (2000).
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that he had never had to do such a thing before, and he
wasn't going to begin at this time of life.
The King's argument was that anything that had a head
could be beheaded, and that you weren't to talk
nonsense. The Queen's argument was that, if
something wasn't done about it in less than no time,
she'd have everybody executed, all round. (It was this
last remark that had made the whole party look so
grave and anxious.)2 1
Despite the clarity of language in the Nuremberg Charter and
the strengthening of these principles via conventions, 22 regional
treaties,23 and the most recent declarations in the Statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 24
21. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 66.
22. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htin (posted July 20, 1998) (proclaiming
that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" and that "[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment");
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the U. N. GeneralAssembly
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
accpr.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2000) (codifying many of the guarantees set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
23. E.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
4 Nov. 1950, available at http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/5e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2000)
(the European Convention on Human Rights); American Convention on Human Rights,
22 Nov. 1969, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/englishltreaties/b-32.htm (last visited
Nov. 7,2000).
24. The full title of the ICTY is the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. The ICTY was the first international war
crimes tribunal established since World War II. The United Nations' Security Council,
operating under its Title VII powers, created the ICTY on May25, 1993, by adopting
Security Council Resolution 827. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993). The Statute governing the ICTY was attached as an addendum to
Resolution 827, and is available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm (last visited
Nov. 7, 2000) [hereinafter "ICTY Statute"]. In particular, Article 7 declares in pertinent part
as follows:
Article 7 Individual criminal responsibility
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in
articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
Id. at art. 7.
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("ICTY"), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 25
("ICTR") and the forthcoming International Criminal Court
("ICC"),2 6 the actual obligation of prosecuting either former or sitting
heads of state remains a formidable task.27 Historically, there have
been few heads of state who have suffered punishment or even
prosecution for their numerous crimes and offenses. 28 In modem
25. The full title of the ICTR is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens
Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighboring States Between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The ICTR was established in
1994 by United Nations' Security Council Resolution. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (1994). The Statute governing the ICTR was attached as an
addendum to Resolution 955, and is available in the "basic texts" menu at http://www.ictr.org
(last visited Nov. 7, 2000) [hereinafter "ICTR Statute"]. In particular, Article 6 declares in
pertinent part as follows:
Article 6 Individual criminal responsibility
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in
articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually liable for the crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
Id. at art. 6.
26. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF/183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter "Rome Statute"].
The Rome Statute unequivocally ensures in Article 25 that "[a] person who commits a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for
punishment in accordance with this Statute." Id. at art. 25. Article 27 further proclaims that
the Statute
shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a
member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall'it, in and of itself, constitute a ground
for reduction of sentence.
Id. at art. 27.
27. Both the Pinochet trial and coverage of the Habre trials have centered around the
issue of whether the receiving state (i.e., the United Kingdom regarding Pinochet and Senegal
regarding Habre) has ratified the 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and/or
incorporated its provisions into domestic law. T.R. Reid, Issue Changed Rules for World's
Dictators, Pinochet Heads Home to Uncertain Future, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 3, 2000.
28. As one author notes, "[i]n January 1793, the French parliament spent three
agonizing days debating how to punish King Louis XVI before deciding to send him to the
guillotine. Two hundred years later, similar debates continue to rage in many places." Jamal
Benomar, Justice After Transitions, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING
DEMOCRACIES RECKON wrrTH FORMER REGIMES 32 (Neil J Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE]. One example of how the "debate continues" was Romania's
response to the end of communism. In December 1989, Romania permitted the summary
execution of its dictator Nicolae Ceasescu and his wife Elena. Id. at 34.
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times, heads of state arrogantly continue to flaunt their hold on power
and their ability to avoid criminal liability.29
To date, no sitting head of state has been criminally
prosecuted or punished by another state for crimes against humanity,
genocide or state-sponsored torture. 30 Not for crimes occurring in
Argentina.3 1  Not for crimes in Uruguay. 32  Not for crimes in
Cambodia.33 Not for crimes in Ethiopia. Not for crimes in China.
Not for crimes in Paraguay. Not for crimes in Sierra Leone.34 Not
for crimes in Indonesia. 35 Not for crimes committed in Kosovo or
29. Supra notes 11-14. But see supra note 18 discussing the ICTR's prosecution and
punishment of former Rwandan Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda.
30. In fact, the only international prosecution of a head of state this author found
remains the case involving Jean Kambanda, supra note 18.
31. For a thoughtful treatment of the Argentine choices following the well-known
"dirty war," see Jose Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former
Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
supra note 28, at 3, 20.
32. Id. at 27.
33. One reporter suggests that "[t]he 3,000 or so victims for which Pinochet is held
responsible during his 1973 to 1990 dictatorship pale in comparison with an estimated
1,700,000 killed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia's killing field and where so far not a
single person has been brought to justice." Joe L. Spartz, Pinochet Case, a Human Rights
Victory?, JAKARTA POST, Jan. 29, 2000.
See also R. Jeffrey Smith, Secretive Leader Presided Over Regime of Torture and Death,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1997, at A01, reporting that:
In the annals of modem war crimes, the Khmer Rouge crimes are probably
second only to those committed by the Nazis in World War II, which led to the
deaths of as many as 11 million Jews and others over a 12-year period. Nothing
in recent history-neither the atrocities in Rwanda nor in the Balkans-
compares with the scale of social terror wrought by the Khmer Rouge in
Cambodia. According to various estimates, as many as one-fifth to one-quarter
of all Cambodians alive at the outset of the party's rule had, by 1978, been
killed by its forces or perished from famine, disease or starvation provoked by
misbegotten economic and social policies.
34. But see U.N. Security Resolution 1315, adopted on Aug. 14, 2000, recommending
that an ad hoc war crimes tribunal be established to deal with the atrocities committed in
Sierra Leone. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000). In
particular, Resolution 1315 recommends "that the special court should have personaljurisdiction over persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of the
crimes referred to in paragraph 2, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes,
have threatened the establishment and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone."
Id. The proposed Sierra Leone tribunal would have jurisdiction over "crimes against
humanity, war crimes and other serious violation of international humanitarian law."
Resolution 1315 also suggests that the eventual creation of such Sierra Leone tribunal might
benefit from simply sharing the appeals tribunal currently in place for the two predecessors
ad hoc institutions-the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Id.
35. Former President Suharto has, however, been arrested and may yet stand trial for
alleged financial crimes. Suharto is accused of misappropriating nearly U.S.$600 million in
Indonesian funds in addition to various allegations of torture and human rights violations.
The current trial is limited merely to allegations of financial wrongdoing-another indication
( 9:193
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Yugoslavia.3 6 Not for crimes in Uganda. Not for crimes of apartheid
committed in South Africa,37 or the still unresolved issue of crimes
that dictators can flout their power with continuing impunity as human rights violations go
largely unpunished. Mark Landler, Doubts That Suharto Will Ever Go to Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2000, at A12.
36. Although Slobodan Milosevic was indicted by the ICTY on May27, 1999, his
arrest and ultimate prosecution remains less than certain. See generally ICTY website at
http://www.un.org/icty for information relating to the ICTY, the ICTY Statute and any of the
ICTY defendants-including the indictment and international arrest warrant issued against
President Milosevic.
37. This remains true despite the presence of an International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973,
1015 U.N.T.S. 243, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/11.htm (last visited
Nov. 7, 2000). Much like the clarity of language presented in the Genocide Convention, the
Convention on the Punishment of Apartheid declares in pertinent part as follows:
Article I
1. The State Parties to the present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime
against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices
of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and
discrimination, as defined in article II of the Convention, are crimes violating
the principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a serious threat to
international peace and security.
2. The State Parties to the present Convention declare criminal those
organizations, institutions and individuals committing the crime of apartheid.
Article II
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "the crime of apartheid,"
which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and
discrimination as practised in southern Africa, shall apply to the following
inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining
domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of
persons and systematically oppressing them:
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups the right
to life and liberty of person:
(i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups;
(ii) By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups
of serious bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their
freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of
a racial group or groups;
(b) Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions
calculated to cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part;
(c) Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a
racial group or groups from participation in the political, social,
economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation of
conditions preventing the full development of such group or groups, in
particular by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic
human rights and freedoms...
(d) Any measures, including legislative measures, designed to divide the
population along racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and
ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the prohibition of
mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the
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committed in Chile,38 and, not for, most recently, the recognition of
Milosevic's alleged crimes against humanity. But, just possibly, with
the arrest and much-heralded prosecution of Hissene Hambre,
Indonesia's Suharto, and the potential indictment of former
expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or
to members thereof;
(e) Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or groups,
in particular by submitting them to forced labour;
(f) Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of
fundamental rights and freedoms, because they oppose apartheid.
Article III
International criminal responsibility shall apply, irrespective of the motive
involved, to individuals, members of organizations and institutions and
representatives of the State, whether residing in the territory of the State in
which the acts are perpetrated or in some other State, whenever they:
(a) Commit, participate in, directly incite or conspire in the commission
of the acts mentioned in article II of the present Convention;
(b) Directly abet, encourage or cooperate in the commission of the crime
of apartheid.
Article IV
The States Parties to the present Convention undertake:
(a) To adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as
well as to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and
similar segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish
persons guilty of that crime;
(b) To adopt legislative, judicial and administrative measures to
prosecute, bring to trial and punish in accordance with their jurisdiction
persons responsible for, or accused of, the acts defined in article II of the
present Convention, whether or not such persons reside in the territory of
the State in which the acts are committed or are nationals of that State or
of some other State or are stateless persons.
Article V
Persons charged with the acts enumerated in article II of the present Convention
may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the Convention which
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused or by an international
penal tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to those State Parties which shall
have accepted its jurisdiction.
Id. Despite the clarity of the Convention on Apartheid, confirming that Apartheid is a crime
against humanity and unequivocally making individuals liable for their criminal acts, South
Africa has been permitted to address its past via a Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
which provides amnesties to those whose full and complete disclosure warrants merciful
treatment. See the official Truth and Reconciliation Commission website at
http://www.truth.org/za (updated Nov. 3, 2000) for a full accounting of amnesties, the Truth
and Reconciliation Act, and testimony provided to the Commission.
38. At the time of this writing, the domestic treatment of Pinochet remains to be seen.
Now that Pinochet has returned to Chile, some expect-or, at a minimum, hope-that hisimmunity will be lifted domestically and that he will finally have to account in a judicial
forum for the 3197 individuals known to have perished under his rule. See Hoge, infra note
42.
39:193
2000] PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 203
Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner,39 a new pattern may be
emerging.40
The recent decision by the British House of Lords holding that
former Chilean General, Senator, and former Head of State Augusto
Pinochet was not immune as a former head of state from prosecution
for crimes of alleged torture during the 1980s sparks hope that the
jurisprudential and political tide may truly be turning. The clearest
evidence of such change is Chile's response to Pinochet's release
from British custody on "medical" grounds. On Tuesday, August 8,
2000, the Chilean Supreme Court strengthened the Pinochet precedent
by voting fourteen to six that Pinochet's self-serving "immunity for
life" designation did not protect him from prosecution for human
rights violations in Chile.4' Currently, there are approximately 154
civil suits pending against the eighty-four year old Pinochet based on
his alleged involvement in numerous killings, cases of torture, and
disappearances.
Many human rights activists and scholars have openly
proclaimed that the Pinochet precedent is one of the most important
advances since the Nuremberg Trials.42 Could we be approaching an
39. A congressional commission in Brazil has purportedly filed a petition to secure the
indictment of former Paraguayan dictator, Alfredo Stroessner, who currently resides in
Brasilia. Jonathan Power, Global Court Closing in on Tyrants at Large, TORONTO STAR,
Aug. 18, 2000, at ED01.
40. Habre, the former Head of State of Chad, pleaded "not guilty" to charges of 97
alleged political killings, 142 cases of alleged torture and 100 cases of "disappearances" (i.e.
cases where the bodies have still not been recovered). See Karl Vick, African Eyes Opened
by Ex-Leader's Indictment: Where Impunity Prevails, Chadian's Case Is a First, WASH.
POST, Feb. 5,2000, at A13.
41. Pinochet Loses Immunity in Chile Ruling, REUTERS, Aug. 8, 2000. The Chilean
Supreme Court's finding galvanized the movement in Chile for accountability. Previously, a
Santiago court had ruled that Pinochet's immunity did not protect him against prosecution for
the crimes alleged. Id.
42. Warren Hoge, After 16 Months of House Arrest, Pinochet Quits England, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at A6 (reporting that Amnesty International issued a statement
proclaiming that "the case represented the greatest advancement for international law since
the Nuremberg trials"). Demonstrating a much broader understanding of international law
(i.e. the development of two ad hoe tribunals to adjudicate war crimes emanating from the
former Yugoslavia and Rwandaprior to the Pinochet precedent), Professor Diane Orentlicher
suggests that "the Law Lords' ruling [in the Pinochet case] is part of a larger trend emerging
in the past few years: the beginning of the end of impunity." Diane F. Orentlicher, Crimes
Against Humanity, Nuremberg Comes Back to Haunt Pinochet, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1998, at
MI; see also David Adams, 'Pinochet Precedent' Ends Era of Impunity for Leaders, St.
Petersburg Times, Mar. 5, 2000, at 2A (reporting that Reed Brody, Advocacy Director of
Human Rights Watch, considers the Pinochet precedent as marking "the end of an era of
impunity for world leaders"); Ex-Chad Ruler Is Charged by Senegal with Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at A3 (quoting Reed Brody's reaction to the arrest of Habre as follows:
"[t]oday's indictment [of Habre] is a wake-up call to dictators in Africa and elsewhere that if
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era where kings might be subject to the same laws and regulations
that govern their subjects? Couldwe actually be nearing a time when
the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention will deliver the
protection and relief they promise? 43 Are we reaching that point-
long strived for by proponents of human rights-where law, in the
form of criminal culpability, will triumph over politics? 44
III. STATE PRACTICE
At this moment the King, who had been for some time
busily writing in his note-book, called out "Silence!"
and read out from his book "Rule Forty-two. All
persons more than a mile high to leave the court."
Everybody looked at Alice.
"I'm not a mile high," said Alice.
"You are," said the King.
"Nearly two miles high," added the Queen.
"Well, I shan't go, at any rate," said Alice; "besides,
that's not a regular rule: you invented it just now."
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King.
"Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice.45
International law places a unique emphasis on state practice-
not only on what states proclaim their belief of the law to be, but also
on what states actually do.4 6 State practice for prosecution of
international crimes based on torture, genocide, and other similarly
heinous crimes is practically non-existent.4 7 Honest scholarship
they commit similar atrocities they could also be brought to justice one day.") [hereinafter
Ex-ChadRuler].
43. See infra notes 72, 73.
44. The recent arrest of Habre was welcomed by the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Mary Robinson, who declared that the decision of the Senegalese court to
prosecute Habre is "further confirmation that torture is an international crime subject to
universal jurisdiction." UN Backing for Habre Charges, BBC NEWS ONLINE, available at
http://www.bbe.co.uk (Feb. 5, 2000).
45. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 92.
46. See generally Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Laiv
and International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 141-42 (1998); Steven R. Ratner, New
Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707, 726-27
(1999) (describing the importance of state practice in dealing with abuses of the past).,
47. See supra notes 9-19. Nearly fifty years expired between Nuremberg and the
Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and the next attempt to prosecute and punish war criminals at
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requires 'an admission that the Pinochet precedent cuts against
existing state practice.48 -,This may explain why the second case
involving-Hissene'Habte Was initidily celebrated with such acclaim,49
and why his ultimate immunity from prosecution causes new concern.
Just as it seems there may'be a shift such that might triumphs over
right, another former dictator is under house arrest pending
prosecution, 50 and a second deposed dictator faces the threat of
indictment in his chosen sanctuary.51 Then, Yugoslavian citizens
surprise the world and oust their former dictator and make him
vulnerable to prosecution. 52 Currently the international community
the Hague under the ICTY Statute. The ICTR appeared nearly one year later and has been
only the second structured attempt at prosecutions since Nuremberg and Tokyo. These two
ad hoe tribunals appeared long after the genocide in Cambodia, the Franco regime in Spain,
the "dirty war" in Argentina, the Marcos' regime in the Philippines, the knowledge of
"Comfort Women" in Japan and many similar instances of known violations of international
law as set forth in numerous treaties. The state practice-despite the clarity of language in
the Genocide and Torture Conventions-continues to be that political responses are much
more likely to occur than prosecutorial response. See generally Louis Henkin,
Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in International Law, 60 ALB.
L. REV. 571, 577 (1997).
State practice has permitted full scale amnesties, pardons and resort to truth
commissions on a local level with occasional rhetoric that such practices fall short of the
international guarantees to personal security. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher,
International Criminal Law and the Cambodian Killing Fields, 3 IT'L L. STUDENTS ASS'N J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 705, 705-06 (1997). See also supra note 37, comparing the commands of
the Convention on Apartheid with the actual practices of South Africa. In this fashion, state
practice belies the result reached in the Pinochet case. Although words to the effect that
position, power, and influence will not immunize an individual from prosecution appear in
numerous treaties, few-if any-countries have ever put their judicial force behind these
previously empty promises to try another country's head of state.
48. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 18 (1992)
(maintaining that since the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the political price for cessation of
hostilities in war and civil strife is the award of amnesties-like the one granted Pinochet and
his associates-for the defeated forces in exchange for peace); Aryeh Neier, What Should Be
Done About the Guilty?, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 172, 177-78 (describing
the amnesties awarded in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Chile in the
1980s. These amnesties would cover many of the same acts that Pinochet was accused of
committing yet there is not the same clamoring for the renunciation of amnesties anywhere
outside Chile.); see also Zalaquett, supra note 31 (describing generally the distinction
between the Argentinean response to the "dirty war" that resulted in sparse prosecutions and
the Uruguayan response that resulted in a full-scale award of amnesty).
49. Ex-Chad Ruler, supra note 42 (stating that the Habre case marks "the first time that
a former African head of state has been charged with human rights violations by the court of
another country").
50. See supra note 35 (describing the pending proceedings against former Indonesian
President Suharto).
51. See supra note 39 (describing the ongoing movement in the Brazilian Congress to
indict Alfredo Stroessner).
52. When the Party's Over: Can Vojislav Kostunica Reassure Both His Well-Wishers
and Those Who Mistrust Him?, EcONOMIST, Oct. 14, 2000 (noting that Milosevic is likely to
be prosecuted at least for electoral fraud and corruption) [hereinafter When the Party's Over].
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may only watch and wait to learn whether Suharto, Stroessner, or
Milosevic will be held accountable for their alleged crimes. 53
Following the Chilean Supreme Court's decision upholding
the House of Lords' determination that sovereign immunity will not
preclude prosecution for crimes against humanity and torture, we can
begin to establish with increasing credibility that those dictators who
have previously committed unspeakable acts are vulnerable to
prosecution. 54 As one reporter suggests, "[t]he sum of all this
[prosecutorial] activity... is to effectively lock up former dictators in
their places of refuge. They dare not venture far from where they
think they are secure." 55
But, based on the concept of state practice and the
well-established concepts of nullum crimen sine lege56 and nulla
poena sine lege,57 the Pinochet precedent may ultimately be referred
to with the same uneasiness that Nuremberg is.58 Nuremberg is an
exemplary testament to "victor's justice;" 59 i.e., that the spoils of war
53. See Landler, supra note 35 (forecasting that "it is far from clear that the 79 year-old
former president [Suharto] will ever stand in the dock").
54. See also, Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2555 (1991) (asserting that the
trials at Nuremberg, whereby a court comprised of international jurists passed judgment on
German nationals for conduct largely committed within the confines of Germany, "broadened
the scope of international law" because prior to that time international law had never
addressed a state's treatment of its own citizens-much less imposed criminal sanctions for
such conduct).
55. Power, supra note 39.
56. Any trepidation regarding nullum crimen sine lege ("no crime without law," a
concept similar to the prohibition in the U.S. Constitution of ex post facto application of law)
has been envisioned and remedied by the Rome Statute at Article 22. See supra note 26, at
art. 22 (assuring that "[a] person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless
the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court").
57. Any fear regarding nulla poena sine lege ("no punishment without law," also
similar to the United States' ex post facto doctrine) has likewise been considered and
nullified by the Rome Statute at Article 23. See supra note 26, at art. 23 (indicating that "[a]
person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute").
58. FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE MONOPOLIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 37
(1995) (contending that the basis of international criminal law stems from customary
international standards, i.e. state practice).
59. See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. ScHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRuIINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 332 (1994) (stating that
"[a] primary criticism of Nuremberg was that it amounted to victor's justice since the tribunal
was composed exclusively of prosecutors and judges from the victorious countries and the
defendants were limited to Germans, even though the Allied personnel also committed
serious violations of humanitarian law during the war."); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, From
Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent
International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 29 (1997) (criticizing the fact that
[39:193
2000] PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 207
(up to and including criminal punishments) will be meted out by the
victors of war. 60 Likewise, although the Pinochet case may be hailed
as a moral victory, its legal grounding was neither indisputable nor
certain.61 Despite the history of torture, genocide, and numerous war
crimes committed by dictators and oppressive rulers, Pinochet was
indeed the first former head of state hauled into the court of law of
another state on charges of torture, disappearances and murder. 2
Suharto, a former dictator facing domestic prosecution, may provide
further momentum. However, the recent release and cessation of
prosecution against Hissene Habre undermines the Pinochet
precedent. In fact, one criticism of Senegal's decision to drop the
charges against Habre-based on the court chamber's finding that
Senegal has no jurisdiction to prosecute torture committed abroad-is
that "Senegal enjoys one of Africa's most independent judiciaries." 63
A second, perhaps more forceful challenge to this action, is that
Senegal was the first country to ratify the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.64 There can surely be no greater act of
hypocrisy or demonstration of impotence in one's own country than
to sign on to the forthcoming "world court" and then proclaim that
one's country does not have the power or authority to prosecute
torture. This action runs contrary to both the spirit of the Convention
Against Torture and the spirit of the Rome Statute, and arguably
undermines the Pinochet precedent.
all of the Nuremberg defendants were Germans, thereby resulting in a one-sided prosecution
for war crimes).
60. But see BENJAMIN FERENCZ, 1 AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP
TOWARD WORLD PEACE 88-89 (1980) (arguing that neither the validity of the judgments of
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, nor the fairness of the trials, were diminished by the fact
that the judges hailed from the victors' states); JOSEPH E. PERSiCO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON
TRIAL 440 (excusing Nuremberg's application of victor's justice on the moral ground that
justice was satisfied).
61. Cf Helena Cobban, Human Rights Prosecution: Whose Job Should It Be?,
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Feb. 10, 2000, at 11 (observing that "[i]n recent years, democracy
activists worldwide have pursued several ways to deal with gross rights abuses, such as
torture. These include the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Former
Yugoslavia, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, blanket amnesties in some
Latin American countries, and the campaign for a permanent International Criminal Court.").
62. This reality conflicts with the prediction of Sir Harley Shaweross, the United
Kingdom's Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, who proclaimed that:
[t]he charter of this tribunal gives warning for the future-I say, and repeat
again, gives warning for the future, to dictators and tyrants masquerading as a
state, that if... they debase the sanctity of man in their own countries, they act
at their peril, for they affront the international law of mankind.
Orentlicher, supra note 42.
63. Justice Denied in Senegal, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, July21, 2000, at A18.
64. Id.
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Perhaps the greatest difficulty this author has experienced in
accepting the Pinochet precedent is that those countries arguing most
strongly for prosecution-Spain, Belgium Switzerland, France and
the United Kingdom-disingenuously relied on the force of
international law (via resort to frequently unenforced treaties),
morality, and the need to end impunity as reasons for acting against
Pinochet.65 Moral authority does not provide a sufficient basis,
standing alone, to support criminal prosecutions. 66 Rather, as a world
bound by legal precedents, procedures, and treaties that restrain state
action, it would have been more prudent to recognize that the issue of
prosecuting former and sitting heads of state is opaque at best.
State practice surely did not-and, arguably does not-
support the Pinochet precedent.67 In fact, not even the state practice
of the most ardent supporters of his prosecution has demonstrated a
past willingness to prosecute heads of state. 68 France continues to
provide refuge to Duvalier. 69 Senegal has determined that, despite its
position as the first state to ratify the Rome Statute and despite the
force of the Pinochet rulings, it does not have authority to prosecute
65. See PEPSICO, supra note 60, at 442 (asserting that "[b]etween 1945 and 1992, the
world experienced twenty-four wars between nations, costing 6,623,000 civilian land military
lives. Ninety-three civil wars, wars of independence, and insurgencies have cost 15,513,000
additional lives. Until 1993 [when the ICTY was created], no international instrument had
been convened to try any aggressor or any perpetrator of war crimes in any of these 117
conflicts.").
66. See Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 237, 256 (1998), observing that the decision whether to prosecute individuals for
gross violations of human rights continues to remain in the power of a few elite nation states.
This system, Professor Ratner argues, will likely perpetuate the notion of "victor's justice"
that criminal prosecution for violations of international law will only be meted out by the
powerful states against other countries and their citizens.
67. Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 507, 508-12 (1999).
68. Cf Stephan Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of
Prosecution and Truth Commissions, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 82 (1996) (explaining
that truth commissions-and not resort to criminal prosecutions or international war crimes
tribunals-have dominated the treatment of Pinochet-type regimes for the past twenty-one
years). The resort to Truth Commissions is not aberrational. Furthermore, the utilization of a
Truth Commission and broad amnesties has apparently been deemed acceptable to the
international community for the handling of South Africa's apartheid criminals. See supra
note 37. Although certain individuals will not be granted amnesties, the state practice
regarding amnesties in South Africa will undoubtedly be referenced by later alleged
criminals.
Regardless of whether South Africa is considered merely an anomaly, the failure to
bring many of these confessed murders and torturers to justice for the horrible crimes of
apartheid devalues the principles that all individuals will be subject to criminal prosecutions
for crimes of an international magnitude. See supra note 37. Once again, we are moving
away from the clarity that Nuremberg purportedly offered.
69. See An African Pinochet, supra note 11.
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acts of torture committed abroad. And now, with the unexpected
transition to democracy in Yugoslavia, the European: Union has
agreed to lift economic sanctions against Yugoslavia without
mandating that action be taken on the outstanding Milosevic
indictment.70  Yugoslavia's projected re-admittance to the
International Monetary Fund before the year's end indicates a clear
delineation between economic sanctions as punishment and individual
criminal prosecutions as a means of confirming and upholding human
rights norms.7 1
The best evidence of this moral paradox can be discerned in
the "state practice" of the five European states initiating the Pinochet
proceedings that falls well short of the behavior required under
international law. While states may prosecute individuals under the
Torture Convention when such alleged torturers are found on state
soil, the United Nations has never required prosecution. 72 Likewise,
70. Quickly following suit was the United States. On October 12, 2000, President
Clinton lifted various oil, trade and flight sanctions that had been imposed against
Yugoslavia. Lawrence L. Knutson, U.S. Lifts Yugoslavia Sanctions, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct. 12, 2000, available at WL 27905642. Recognizing the importance of the Yugoslavian
transition to democracy, President Clinton asserted that "[t]he victory of freedom in Serbia is
one of the most hopeful developments in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall." Id.
Continuing, President Clinton affirmed that this transition "ended a dictatorship and it can
liberate an entire region from the nagging fear that ethnic differences can again be exploited
to start wars and shift borders." Id.
71. See When the Party's Over, supra note 52.
72. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The
relevant language of the Torture Convention is as follows:
Article 1
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity....
Article 2
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat
of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture.
3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as
a justification of torture.
Article 4
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its
criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an
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although the Genocide Convention requires prosecution or
extradition, the Convention also envisions the creation of an
international criminal court that has not yet come into being.73  In
act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offenses punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature.
Article 5
1. Each State party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish
its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its
jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State:
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it
appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over such offenses in cases where the alleged offender
is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him
pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article,
Article 7
1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to
have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases
contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to itS
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Id. This language, though seemingly clear, has never been determined by the United Nations
to require prosecution of another state's nationals-particularly not another country's head of
state.
73. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted
by the U. N. General Assembly Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. The relevant language of the
Genocide Convention is as follows:
Article I
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake
to prevent and to punish.
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
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contrast to these two treaty-based scenarios, the United Nations has
required and mandated state cooperation under the statutes of both the
ICTY and ICTR in the area of criminal prosecution.74
Cooperation has been lacking in the important area of state
enforcement of criminal sentences. 75 There is no exception provided
in the ICTY Statute to countries trying to assist in nation-building.
The duty to prosecute heads of state is unequivocal. Yet, the realities
of international law suggest that the arrest and detainment of
Milosevic, if they occur, will come only when the political climate,
both within Yugoslavia76 and throughout Europe, becomes capable of
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Article IV
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals.
Article V
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the
present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons
guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.
Article VI
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article Ill
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the
act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted
its jurisdiction.
Id.
74. Security Council Resolution 827, which established the ICTY, mandates that all
States shall "cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with
the present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal." S.C. Res. 827, supra
note 24, at 2. Resolution 827 further requires that states "take any measures necessary under
their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute." Id.
Security Council Resolution 955, supra note 25, provides a nearly identical provision.
75. Article 29 of the ICTY Statute requires that nation states fully cooperate in the
enforcement of criminal sentences. The statutory language provides in pertinent part that:
1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and
prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international
humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or
an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to:
(d) the arrest or detention of persons.
ICTY Statute, supra note 24, at art. 29. Article 28 of the ICTR Statute provides a nearly
identical requirement that states comply with requests for cooperation from the tribunal.
ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 28.
76. Mark Egan, Yugoslavia Could Rejoin IMF in Months, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2000.
Kostunica has indicated that bringing Milosevic to justice is not an immediate concern.
When pressed on the issue, the newly-elected President declared that "[i]n the Serbia and
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withstanding this action.77 Currently, the period of transition in
Yugoslavia is far too fragile to exercise the rule of law from outside
the country.78 But even beyond the immediate quandary posed by
Milosevic, the European countries have fallen short of their duties
under the ICTY Statute.79
Unlike the Pinochet precedent, which was observed loosely at
best, the authority of the two U.N. ad hoe tribunals has been firmly
established by Security Council Resolution8 ° and subsequent
jurisprudence. Further, both tribunal statutes mandate individual
state cooperation in the enforcement of criminal sentences. 82 The
former President of the ICTY, the Honorable Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, openly called for increased cooperation by nation-states in
a speech at American University in 1998.83 Judge McDonald
explained that "the nature of the modem State and its place in the
international community means that it is they [the individual states]
who are expected, in fact required, to provide the structural and
systematic support necessary to sustain the Tribunal."84
Yugoslavia of today such an issue is not the most urgent .... And because I think that, if
some made [a request to extradite Milosevic] I would say no." Id.
77. See When the Party's Over, supra note 52.
78. Id.
79. David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice,
23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 473, 483-85 (1999).
80. See supra notes 24-25, citing the two Security Council resolutions that established
these tribunals.
81. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of May7, 1997 and Sentencing
Judgment of July 14, 1997, IT-94-1, available at http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2000); The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgment of Sept. 2, 1998 and
Sentence of Oct. 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, available at http://www.ictr.org (last visited
Nov. 13, 2000).
82. Article 27 of the ICTY Statute, supra note 24, provides in pertinent part as follows:
Imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the International Tribunal
from a list of States, which have indicated to the Security Council their
willingness to accept convicted persons. Such imprisonment shall be in
accordance with the applicable law of the State concerned, subject to the
supervision of the International Tribunal.
Article 26 of the ICTR Statute is nearly identical, although it explicitly envisions possible
incarceration of ICTR convicts in Rwandan prisons. ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at art. 26.
83. Judge McDonald joined many other notable international scholars and jurists at a
conference entitled War Crimes Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects, which took place
at American University's Washington College of Law from March 31-April 1, 1998. The
conference papers are collected and reprinted in Vol. 13, Number 6 of the American
University International Law Review (1998).
84. The Honorable Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Conference on War Crimes Tribunals:
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1422, 1426 (1998).
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Despite the clarity of the statutory language and the continued
acknowledgment that states are not adequately assisting with
enforcement, only seven European States have agreed to render prison
space to the ICTY.85  Only two African states have offered their
assistance in receiving ICTR prisoners. 86 Where, one must ask, are
Belgium, Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom with respect
to this international legal conundrum?87 And, where is the United
States? Where is the force of moral authority that these countries so
vehemently displayed when faced with the arrest and possible
prosecution of Pinochet?88 Why is there not an equally supportive
attitude displayed toward the prosecution of the war crimes
committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda? 89
85. Interestingly, Spain became the seventh cooperating state when it penned its
agreement with the ICTY on March 28, 2000. Spain to Become the Seventh State to Sign an
Agreement on the Enforcement of Sentences, Press Release No: 482-E, Mar. 28, 2000,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p482-e.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2000)
[hereinafter Spain Enforcement Press Release]. This agreement follows the numerous
activities surrounding Pinochet and demonstrates, perhaps, a newfound awareness by Spain
that participation in international criminal law cannot be sporadic. Spain follows Italy, the
first state to have agreed to accept ICTY prisoners on February 6, 1997, Finland, which gave
its consent on May 7, 1997, Norway (Apr. 24, 1998), Sweden (Feb. 23, 1999), Austria
(July 23, 1999), and France (Feb. 25, 2000). See various press releases available at
http://www.un.orglicty/press.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2000). Spain still has not agreed,
however, to accept ICTR prisoners pursuant to its obligation under Security Resolution 955.
See supra note 25.
86. It is disconcerting, at best, to note that no European nation has agreed to accept any
of the Rwandan prisoners. Only the African nations of Mali and Benin have agreed to accept
ICTR prisoners. See Agreement on Enforcement of Tribunal Sentences Signed in Benin,
Press Release No. ICTR/INFO-9-2-200, Aug. 26, 1999, available at http://www.ictr.org (last
visited Nov. 7, 2000). This Press Release indicates that "certain European States have
indicated their willingness to accommodate ICTR convicts," but as yet none have entered
into the requisite agreement (emphasis added). Id.
87. See Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement in
International Criminal Law, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321, 388 n.243 (2000). The U.N.
Secretary-General sent a letter to all member states regarding the enforcement of sentences
and invited each to acknowledge whether they were capable of providing assistance to the
ICTR. Id. Of the five European states pursing the Pinochet case, only Belgium and Switzer-
land have indicated a "willingness" to receive ICTR prisoners. Id. This "willingness,"
however, has not been accompanied by the requisite formal agreement enabling the ICTR to
transport prisoners to these states. Id.
88. See Spartz, supra note 33 (asserting that "[w]ith some justification, the question
may be asked whether Western nations are only willing or prepared to prosecute human
rights cases involving their own citizens and whether or not their vigorous attempt at bringing
Pinochet to justice is truly unbiased and free of prosecutorial discrimination"). A second
reporter questions whether "other former heads of state might face arrest outside their
countries less because of what they are accused of having done, than because of who they
are." Doubts That Linger, TIMEs (LONDON), Mar. 3, 2000.
89. See generally Penrose, supra note 87 (discussing the numerous instances where lack
of support from the international community and individual states has hampered the success
of the ICTY and ICTR).
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The difficulty of moral authority is that it falters when the true
"morality" of the position being asserted is unveiled. None of the
Pinochet countries has fully met the requirements under either the
ICTY or ICTR Statutes. 90 Spain alone has agreed to accept ICTY
prisoners (and only as recently as March 28, 2000, after proceedings
against Pinochet were initiated).91  Is moral authority only an
acceptable answer when the state pursuing the prosecution has been
harmed, or has had citizens harmed, by the acts of the individuals
being punished? And if so, do we not return immediately to "victor's
justice," which permeated Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunal?
As we continue to seek a truly international solution to torture,
genocide, and crimes against humanity, perhaps we should pause to
consider state practice. State practice is a legitimate and
well-established principle of international law. Current state practice
indicates an increasing trend toward eradicating immunity. This trend
is only just beginning to gain ground and still does not demonstrate
with sufficient forcefulness that dictators-e.g., Pol Pot, Idi Amin,
Mengistu Haile Mariam, "Baby Doc" Duvalier, Moammar Gadhafi,
Alfredo Stroessner and Slobodan Milosevic-will be subject to
prosecution. In fact, state practice currently weighs more heavily on
the side of Truth Commissions and Amnesties than on the side of
criminal prosecutions. 92
The Pinochet and Habre precedents, to the extent that they
evince state practice, confirm that only those dictators who have lost
support at home, in their place of refuge, and abroad will find
themselves seated in the dock, finally facing the possibility of
punishment. And what are we to make of Milosevic? He has been
ousted from power and yet takes refuge in his homeland, despite his
indictment for his role as the architect of ethnic cleansing in
Yugoslavia. 93 While Pinochet appears to be vulnerable to some type
of proceeding in Chile, Senegal has dropped the charges against
Habre. And we remain uncertain about the prospects of actually
prosecuting Milosevic. This makes the current state practice
scorecard one-to-one, with the international community and ICTY
90. See supra notes 85-87.
91. See Spain Enforcement Press Release, supra note 85.
92. Supra notes 47-48.
93. There are indications that although an international trial might not occur or be
sanctioned by the new Serbian government, proceedings under domestic law may be brought
against Milosevic for corruption and election fraud. See When the Party's Over, supra note
52. The suggestion is that once Milosevic is behind bars domestically, it will be more
plausible that he could be held accountable for the international atrocities alleged in the ICTY
indictment. Id.
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practice still undecided. We know what the law requires. We know
what the words say. But for now, we have only one incidence of state
practice operating in favor of prosecution, and one incidence of state
practice disclaiming an ability to prosecute. The case of Milosevic is
the perfect example to demonstrate precisely how the international
community weighs in. Now, with the arrest and indictment of
Suharto we must again wait to see which way Indonesia will lean.
The one variable that remains somewhat consistent in all the
recent cases, except the case of Milosevic, is the advanced age and
failing health of many of these deposed dictators. In both the
Pinochet case and the Suharto matter, extrajudicial investigations
have been necessary to determine whether the accused is physically
capable of standing trial.94 The long span of time that often separates
the fall of the dictator and the rise of sentiment against him or her
results all too often in a question of whether trial may be held against
someone in such poor health. The recent momentum in Brazil against
the former Paraguayan dictator is no exception. Stroessner, the
longest reigning dictator in South America, with a reign of thirty-five
years, is now eighty-seven years old and believed to be in failing
health.95
The factors of initiating criminal proceedings against an
incapable or incapacitated defendant complicates the human rights
issues involved. One must additionally question what cathartic effect,
if any, the prosecution of a defendant legally unfit to defend him or
herself would provide to those still living with the scars of torture and
human rights violations. Thus, while the Pinochet precedent may
remain limited to those few deposed dictators living abroad in exile,
96
the international community has an opportunity to look forward by
creating and maintaining an international criminal court., An even
greater opportunity exists in relation to former President Milosevic.
While Hitler and Mussolini avoided prosecution, Milosevic remains
94. See Landler, supra note 35; see also UN: Deal with Suharto Like Pinochet,
ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLMnE, Sept. 5, 2000 (indicating that a senior United Nations official
advises that Indonesia utilize a procedure similar to that used by the United Kingdom to
determine whether Suharto is "fit" to stand trial).
95. Anthony Faiola, "Pinochet Effect" Spreading: Case Opens Way to Other
Prosecutions, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2000, at A01.
96. Id. Mr. Faiola explains that not only is Uganda's Idi Amin living in exile in Saudi
Arabia, he is also benefitting from the provision of a government stipend there. Further, the
complication of governmental involvement in the escape and subsequent exile of a former
dictator may preclude countries such as France from ever relinquishing their hold on
individuals like Duvalier.
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within our reach. The fate of this single defendant may determine the
legacy of an entire tribunal. 97
IV. THE NEED FOR CONSISTENCY AND AN INTERNATIONAL COURT
"Let the jury consider their verdict," the King said, for
about the twentieth time that day.
"No, no!" said the Queen. "Sentence first-verdict
afterwards."
"Stuff and nonsense!" said Alice loudly. "The idea of
having the sentence first!"
"Hold your tongue!" said the Queen, turning purple.
"I won't!" said Alice.
"Off with her head!" the Queen shouted at the top of
her voice. Nobody moved.98
There are at least 3197 victims believed to have been tortured,
killed, or to have "disappeared" under the Pinochet regime, 99 which
means three thousand one hundred and ninety-seven violations of
international law and three thousand one hundred ninety-seven
reasons to prosecute Pinochet and many of those acting under his
leadership.
The impetus for this Article is a firm belief in the importance
of establishing prosecutorial rules and regulations for the consistent
treatment of criminal defendants, most notably heads of state. The
97. See Statement by Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY, Press Release
No. 532-e, Oct. 6, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p532-e.htm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2000). While praising the transition to democracy, Ms. Del Ponte was quick
to add the following:
Regarding Milosevic, I take this occasion to send the message to President
Elect, Mr. Kostunica, that I am prepared to receive Milosevic in The Hague at
anytime. It is my hope and expectation that the people of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, in their legitimate aspiration to justice, shall express their will to
see Milosevic brought to trial in The Hague. I truly believe that this is the only
solution if there is to be a true and lasting peace in the Balkans and if the people
of Yugoslavia are to enjoy a democratic existence and to be fully accepted back
into the international community.
Id.
98. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 95.
99. Hoge, supra note 42.
This number fails to represent those victimized by the loss of a mother, father, son,
daughter, aunt, uncle, brother, or sister at the hands of their own government: a distinct issue
from that addressed in this Article, but one which deserves attention.
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Nuremberg Principles undoubtedly proffer clarity. What they lack,
however, is the authoritative history of state practice.100 As discussed
above, this oversight is not due to lack of opportunity or potential
defendants.101
Likewise, the Torture 'Convention and Genocide Convention
provide solid and unequivocal language affirming the right to
prosecute. 10 2 But again, the practice of states-including the United
States, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, France, 10 3 the United Kingdom
and, now, Senegal-suggests that despite the clear language,
compliance is rare. The "legal requirement" that an individual
accused of torture or genocide be either punished or prosecuted has
not assisted the many victims of Cambodia, Argentina, 10 4 Sierra
Leone, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Brazil,
Uganda, Ethiopia, Indonesia,' 05 the Congo, 10 6 Chile,'0 7 and most
recently Chad.
With the arrest of Pinochet, his subsequent release by the
United Kingdom, and now the apparent forthcoming domestic
proceedings, the international community has clearly indicated that
perhaps kings are losing their claim to immunity from prosecution for
criminal acts.108 However, the arrest and failed prosecution of
100. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
101. See generally supra notes 11-14.
102. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
103. Indeed, it is France that continues to protect and provide refuge to "Baby Doc"
Duvalier, the former head of state of Haiti. See supra note 13.
104. See generally Scharf, supra note 67.
105. Seth Mydans, Ancient Hatreds, New Battles, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 14, 1999,
at 50 (detailing the scores of deaths that have occurred in the war between Christians and
Muslims in Indonesia).
106. See ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 145 (1998).
107. But see Adams, supra note 42. Adams indicates that the Chilean Supreme Court
issued a ruling declaring that the amnesty decree entered by the Pinochet regime does not
apply in cases where individuals are considered "disappeared"--those cases where the bodies
remain missing. He reports that "the Court argues that these cases could be considered
unresolved kidnappings, a crime not covered by the amnesty." This case, Adams asserts,
has opened the way for the arrests of more than 50 retired military and police
officers, once thought untouchable. This provides at least some comfort to the
families of the more than 2,000 people executed without trial under Pinochet's
reign of terror, as well as tens of thousands of torture cases.
Id.
108. Jack Straw, the Home Secretary of the United Kingdom, assured the British
Parliament that the case of Pinochet "has established beyond question the principle that those
who commit human rights abuses in one country cannot assume they are safe elsewhere."
Hoge, supra note 42.
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Hissene Habre undermined this principle. 10 9  Will future state
practice strengthen the Pinochet precedent? Or will it revert back to
the former state practice that implicitly condones such behavior or
conveniently turns a blind political eye to it? Will we realize that
inertia and the passage of time simply preclude prosecution due to
medical determinations that many of these deposed and exiled
dictators are simply too aged to stand trial?
International law is at a perilous crossroads. Many scholars
believe that the presence of an international criminal court will assist
in unraveling head-of-state immunity. However, we cannot continue
to wait for the creation of such a world court. States must either be
willing to elevate the many principles seemingly codified in the
post-World War II documents to the force of law now or admit states'
reluctance to become involved in the "domestic affairs" of
neighboring countries. If we are truly dealing with an issue of
politics, then the continued resort to legal vernacular will remain
futile.
The response-to be legitimate-cannot be tied to issues of
politics and state relations. Legal norms of this magnitude represent a
concept that transcends borders.110 Now we must wait and see how
the arrest and prosecution of Suharto and, eventually, the fate of
Milosevic, weigh in: prosecution or pardon; prosecution or the
continued ability of deposed dictators to avoid the rule of law? To
establish state practice, the rhetoric must become reality. Law must
not fall casualty to the politics of the moment, or law will simply
become a spurious and reactionary attempt to deal with politically
sensitive issues. The time for disingenuous attempts at noteworthy
prosecutions has long passed. It is time to come together as a world
community and decide whether international prosecutions are a viable
means to deal with others' "domestic affairs."111 Will international
109. Previously, a Truth Commission established by Habre's successor, Idriss Deby,
found that Habre's regime was responsible for approximately 40,000 political killings and
another 200,000 cases of torture. Norimitsu Onishi, An African Dictator Faces Trial in His
Place ofRefuge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at A3.
110. Orentlicher, supra note 9.
111. Cf Orentlicher, supra note 42. Professor Orentlicher credits Nuremberg with
establishing three important principles. Id. "First, the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal in 1945 affirmed that international law makes individuals directly accountable for
crimes against humanity: in essence, atrocities committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against civilian populations. Second, Nuremberg established that sovereign
and head-of-state immunities fall away before the court of humanity." Id. "A third principle
derived from Nuremberg is that the law of humanity can be enforced by any state, no matter
where the crimes occurred." Id.
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law, as embodied by the ICTY Statute and enforced by the Hague
Tribunal, finally live up to its potential? Will Milosevic finally be
subjected to a legal review of his actions?
In late July, 1998, numerous state representatives, scholars,
dignitaries, and non-governmental organizations worked together to
create a permanent international criminal court. Their efforts were
eventually codified in a document referred to as the "Rome
Statute." 112  To date, only twenty-two states 113 have ratified the
Rome Statute. This is thirty-eight states shy of the requisite number
for ratification.114 Conspicuously absent in this short list are two of
those states that clamored for the prosecution of Pinochet:
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
The slow pace in ratifying this crucial international document
raises concern. 115  Either the international community is fully
committed to prosecuting those individuals accused of the most
heinous crimes affecting all of us, such as genocide and torture, or it
is not. Our priorities must go beyond the rare instances when the
politics of the moment have permitted prosecution. 116  The
ratification of the Rome Statute and the subsequent creation of a truly
International Criminal Court will provide the best precedent for
prosecuting Heads of State. The Rome Statue provides: "[a] person
who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be
individually responsible for punishment in accordance with this
Professor Orentlicher continues by observing that:
Nuremberg's claims had great moral power, but the law itself seemed largely
spent force once the postwar machinery of victors' justice was dismantled. The
reasons are not hard to fathom. Governments usually lack sufficient will to
enforce the basic code of humanity against other states and their officials. For
one thing, a state's attempt to bring foreign officials to account cannot help but
destabilize diplomatic relations. Governments also fear the precedent could one
day be invoked against their own officials, which helps explain why
Washington has declined to express support for the proceedings against
Pinochet.
Id.
112. Rome Statute, supra note 26.
113. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm (updated Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Rome
Statute Status].
114. Sadat & Carden, supra note 20, at 387 (explaining that sixty states must ratify the
Rome Statute for the ICC to come into force).
115. Id. (reminding that "classic ideas about sovereignty die hard, and if the road to
Rome was long and difficult, the journey to the seat of the Court at the Hague may be even
more arduous").
116. Two of the more significant examples can be found in the ICTY and ICTR. See
Penrose, supra note 87 (describing the various instances where international law has reacted
to a situation by creating an international tribunal).
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Statute. 117 In addition, there is an explicit admonishment that with
respect to, "[i]n particular, [their] official capacity- as Head of State or
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected
representative or a government shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence." 118
This caveat-when issued with the full force and consent of a
majority of the states in the international community-will avoid the
ex post facto and nullum crimen sine lege challenges that plague the
Pinochet and Nuremberg precedents. There will be no defense that
such procedures are aberrational, are not provided for in international
law, or are at variance with state practice. The warning will be clear,
unambiguous, and enforceable.
Until that time, however, there remain the continuing cases
involving Pinochet, Habre, Suharto, Stroessner, and perhaps most
importantly, Milosevic. But before assuming that the full range of
human rights have been confirmed, we must cautiously assess the
remaining dictators and evaluate the reasons why France, Zimbabwe,
Brazil, and Saudi Arabia are providing refuge. Excepting Saudi
Arabia, each of these states has signed the Rome Statute. 1 I Their
respective signatures indicate a willingness to be bound by the force
of law and to assist in prosecuting those individuals currently finding
safe haven in their country. We must appraise the need for an
international court given the current reality that many states are still
unwilling to interfere in the "domestic affairs" of neighboring states.
Until we have a mandate requiring the surrender and subsequent
prosecution or extradition of deposed dictators, it's still good to be the
king!
117. Supra note 26, at art. 25 (emphasis added).
118. Supra note 26, at art. 27 (emphasis added).
119. See generally Rome Statute Status, supra note 113. Brazil signed the Rome Statute
on February 7, 2000, France on July 18, 1998, and Zimbabwe on July 17, 1998. Yet the
actions of each of these three countries in harboring a former Pinochet-type dictator belies
their belief in the precepts of the ICC.
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